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Abstract
There is a common misconception among those who are not scholars in the field that
the Assyrian Empire was an aggressive one, relying simply on force, rather than
reason, to assert its will over its neighbours and conquer vast territories. Granted that
the Assyrian war machine was unparalleled at its apex, its rulers did not hesitate to
use oaths, treaties and pacts wherever possible. Assyrian foreign policy was complex
and aided Assyrian kings in conquering vast territories, not only with force, but also
with words and the threat of force. In the matter of imperial administration, however,
there appear variations in the policies aimed at the western states of Assyria's empire,
and the policy directed at Babylon.

This dissertation aims to cast light upon those differences, and offer answers to
questions that surface. Administration of conquered lands takes into account cultural
and lingual proximity, as well as religious ideology. Another aim is to present the
differences in Assyrian imperial administration under the kings Esarhaddon and
Assurbanipal, and explores answers as to why these differences arise, as well as
exploring whether foreign or civil policy was used. It also aims to encourage the
notion that Assyria was not just a ruthless military power, but also an early empire
willing to apply different methods to the creation, and administration, of its empire.
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A Note on the Text

The spelling may vary throughout the text depending on circumstances. The
difference between Babylon and Babylonia is the first term is used when referring to
the city, and the second term when referring to the kingdom. Assur will refer to the
city, whilst Assur will refer to the deity. Assurbanipal shall be written as such, unless
directly quoted from another text, in which case no changes will be made to the
spelling, as will Samas-sumu-ukin. The same can be said for all variations of spelling
that arise out of a direct quote from another author.
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Introduction
-Wlien the gods cn~ated mankind
They gave them death
But endless life they kept for themselves-(From the Epic of Gilgmnesh, ca. 1700 BCE),

In his groundbreaking work on Mesopotami~ Leo Oppenheim wrote on the early rise
of civilization:
Early in the fourth millennium B. C. there occurred in southwest Asia a
phenomenon of lasting importance for the history of the world: the appearance
in quick succession of a group of culture foci. Among them were those which
were eventually to give rise to the self-contained and characteristic civilizations
which we may identify by the names of the river valley that harboured them: the
civilizations of the Indus Valley, Euphrates Valley, and Nile Valley. 1

It is the civilization that arose in the Euphrates Valley that concerns us. This research

aims at illustrating several important features of the construction and maintenance of
empire, and to demonstrate the differing approaches taken by Assyria in its imperial
administration. The time period under scrutiny is that when Assyria was at the height
of its power, the years between 680 and 627 BCE, under the kingships of Esarhaddon
and his successor, Assurbanipal. Under these two great kings, the realms of the
Assyrian empire included Egypt, the Levant, Southern Anatolia, Urartu, Elam and
Arabia. 2 Much of the Ancient Near East was at some point under the sway of Assyria,
and its world system was far larger than its imperial borders, 'extending from beyond
the Straights of Gibraltar to Afghanistan' .3

Assyria was able to achieve such a vast and powerful emp1re through shrewd
administration, military prowess, and political and diplomatic planning. It is to its
credit that Assyria was able to field such massive armies with capable generals at the

1

Leo Oppenheim, Ancient Mesopotamia: Portrait ofa Dead Civilization. (Chicago, 1977), pp. 31.
See Map 1 (Appendix 1).
3
Mitchell Allen (2005), "Power is in the Details: Administrative Technology and the growth of
Ancient Near Eastern Cores'.'- in- Christopher Chase-Dunn and Eugene N. Anderson, The Historical
Evolution of World-Systems. (New York, 2005), pp. 75.
2
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helm and an army of bureaucrats ready to solve logistical and management problems
through innovation and adaptation.
Contrary to a popular notion still widely sustained today, Assyria was not an empire
solely built and maintained via force. The belligerent nature of the Assyrian state
ideology and kingship is well known and no doubt accounts for many of its successes
as an empire, yet Assyria was able to resort to diplomacy to expand and consolidate.
As much as it relied on force, the threat of force was in many cases enough to
convince unwilling states to submit to its overlordship. Pacts, treaties and loyalty
oaths played an important part in establishing an Assyrian hegemony in the Ancient
Near East. Notwithstanding the fact that the Assyrian empire has been immortalized
in history as a pitiless and belligerent power, and that its primary means of expansion
was by warfare, the 'expansion of Assyria took place less dramatically, almost
imperceptibly, through political deals with foreign rulers (or would be rulers) seeking
military aid, peace or favours from the Assyrian king' .4

This study will concentrate on the reigns of two Assyrian kings, that of Esarhaddon
(680-669 BCE) and Assurbanipal (668-627 BCE) 5 • The reigns of these two kings
have been chosen because the information relating to their rules is abundant, and they
were the kings of Assyria at a time when it was at its apex. To be able to successfully
prove that differences in foreign policy existed, several key issues will be addressed
throughout the respective chapters. Assyrian reactions to certain events in its Western
provinces a.Jld peripheries will be gauged, as will actions undertaken in the kingdom
of Babylonia.

Such studies will reveal differing Assyrian strategies for dealing with matters
regarding the administration of an empire. Another issue to be dealt with is the need
to understand why this was so. If contrasting policies did exist, why is it that
Babylonia was treated differently to states in Anatolia, the Levant and Egypt? The

4

Simo Parpola and Kazuko Watanabe, Neo-Assyrian Treaties and Loyalty Oaths. (Helsinki, 1988), pp.
XXIII). - *This collection of treaties, pacts and loyalty oaths will form one of the several pillars upon
which this study is based.
5
The chronology used for d~ting is that of Jack Sasson's four volume series on the Ancient Near East,
discussed in greater detail under the subheading dealing with difficulties and sources.
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answers to these questions will be found through an investigation of cultural, religious
and military factors.

Chapter Structure
Chapter 1 will set the background as to the rise of the Assyrian empire up to 680
BCE. It will deal with developments in the Assyrian heartland, as well as with large
portions of the Ancient Near East. The Middle Assyrian kingdom and rise of the
Assyrian empire at the turn of the First Millennium will be covered in this section.
Assyrian dependence on Babylonian culture and religious ideology will be remarked
on, with greater emphasis placed upon it in Chapter 3. The fall of the Amarna Age
and the commencement of the Third Intermediate period in Egypt will be looked at as
one of the factors leading to the rise of Assyria. The fall of the Hittites and Mitanni
are of important nature as it was not until then that Assyria was able to assert itself as
an imperial power. Chapter 1 concludes with the end of Sennacherib and the
beginning ofEsarhaddon's reign.

Chapter 2 concentrates on the nature of Assyrian policy towards its Western
neighbours, provinces and vassals. Specific examples highlight the level of Assyrian
imperial control in the Levant and Egypt and what were the hallmarks of this policy.
Parpola and Watanabe's (1988) collation of treaties and loyalty oaths will provide
very important first hand information into the international workings of the Assyrian
empire under Esarhaddon and Assurbanipal, as will Luckenbill's (1927) collection of
Assyrian and Babylonian records.

The character of Assyrian imperial administration is examined separately under the
two different kings, and then compared so as to establish continuity, or not, in
imperial management. The Levantine states (Judah, Israel and Phoenicia, to name a
few) and Egypt will form the prime examples of Assyrian decision making in the
region. Steven Holloway's research into this area will be a rich source for
investigation; particularly his book Assur is King! Assur is King! Religion in the
Exercise ofPower in the Neo-Assyrian Empire. (Leiden 2002).

Chapter 3 is aimed at asserting the disposition of Assyrian conduct towards
Babylonia. It discusses why after Sennacherib's destruction of Babylon his successor,
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Esarhaddon, endeavours to rebuild Babylon, and undo the workings of his
predecessor. It explains how his motives highlight the variation in Assyrian policy
when dealing with Babylonia and draws attention to his effort at solving the
'perennial Babylonian problem' 6 by installing two sons on the thrones of Assyria and
Babylonia. This chapter also demonstrates that there is no other documented case of
an Assyrian approach to imperial administration by using a member of the royal
family in the position of administrator of a province or vassal state, and how
Assurbanipal continues his

father's

policy of appeasement in Babylonia.

Assurbanipal's re-construction of Babylon, a continuation of his father's plan,
contrasts violently with the sacking of Thebes by his troops. Finally it deals with the
Babylonian led insurgency against Assyria that eventually lead Assurbanipal to
destroy Babylon after four years of 'civil war' .7

Chapter 4 is a comparison in administrative policies between Babylonia and the West
under Esarhaddon and Assurbanipal from 680 to 627 BCE. It also aims to provide an
explanation for the difference in administration policies. It underlines why cultural
and religious continuity is a key factor in the relationship between Assyria and
Babylonia, and how the Assyrian kings embark on an ambitious re-building plan to
restore Babylon as a political manoeuvre to reverse the damage done by Sennacherib.
A short conclusion ends this study.

Sources and Difficulties
A culture l<mg buried under the sands of the ·Middle East is always a challenge to
properly investigate and research. Assyriology has been around for well over a
century, and it is predominantly concerned with the study of Assyrian history, culture,
religion and language, relying both on monumental archaeological remains and
extensive textual information. 8 There are a variety of sources, both primary and
secondary, to turn to.

6

Oppenheim (1977). Op Cit, pp. 169.
Ibid. -The use of the term 'civil war' is interesting since the use of 'civil' to describe the war implies a
closer relationship between Assyria and Babylon, to the extent that Babylon is considered an important
part of the Assyrian world-system core. It deserves further scrutiny in Chapter 3.
8
Jean Bottero, Mesopotamia: Writing, Reasoning and the Gods. (Chicago, 1992), pp. 41-42. Textual
information can mean tablets and seals found within a palace or residence, or palace and wall reliefs,
which are usually, painted depictions of life and the gods in Assyria.
7
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Out of the most important of the primary sources is the State Archives of Assyria
(SAA) series, a collection of textual evidence taken from Assyrian inscriptions, palace
wall reliefs and imperial correspondence, 9 the SAA volume II, Neo-Assyrian Treaties

and Loyalty Oaths (1988) by Parpola and Watanabe proves to be the most
fundamental. Daniel D. Luckenbill's collation of textual evidence from the Ancient
Near East in Ancient Records ofAssyria and Babylonia (1927) is just as important, as
is Kirk Grayson's Assyrian and Babylonian Chronicles (2000).

Secondary evidence comes in the form of several works by authors well known within
the field of Assyriology, and the Ancient Near East in general. Jack Sasson's fourvolume compilation of essays and research about Ancient Near East is the standard
work used to deal with chronology to understand dates that can seem so disparate
from researcher to researcher. Amelie Kuhrt and Marc van de Mieroop both have
books extensively covering the history and development of the Ancient Near Eastern,
making available a wealth of information on Assyria at the turn of the First
Millennium. Likewise, the collection of essays that comprises A Companion to the

Ancient Near East 10 provides several reference points towards the world that Assyria
was a part of.

Special mention must be made to three authors in particular. Leo Oppenheim, Grant
Frame, and Steven Holloway. Frame's book on the relationship between Assyrian and
Babylonia during the years 689 to 627 BCE is indispensable to this study, as is
Holloway's investigation into the Assyrian ·imperial machine, and the religious
convictions that drove it. Leo Oppenheim's book on Mesopotamia is the core
secondary reference, and one of the most seminal sources when dealing with all
aspects of Mesopotamian history.

With any historical study, the disappearance of vital records and monumental
structures over time presents a constant challenge, as happened when the Assyrian
empire fell after Assurbanipal' s death in 627 BCE. It is after the quelling of the
9

The State Archive of Assyria series is a compilation ofNeo-Assyrian texts, mainly those found in the
Nineveh royal palaces, and organized by genre. Funded and organized by the University of Helsinki,
most of the textual information comes from tablets and inscriptions uncovered by archaeology during
the early years of Assyriology. The texts are presented in both the transliterated and English translation
forms.- http://www.helsink~.fi/science/saa/saa.html
10
Daniel Snell (Ed.)~ A Companion to the Ancient Near East, (Oxford 2005).
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Babylonian rebellion by Assurbanipal that Assyrian accounts become uncommon.
yet, substantial information remains for the time period 680-640 BCE as to the
machinations ofthe Assyrian empire. This abundance of information yields, however,
another problem, namely the large number of documents yet to be translated and
collated. Chronology is another issue that arises in the field of Assyriology. When a
new find or translation sheds new evidence on a certain topic dates can change. In
many cases they do depending on the interpretation of certain authors and scholars.
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Chapter 1
The Rise of Assyria

You are sworn by Assur, J(ing of heaven and earth/

1

Chapter One establishes the context for this research topic. The two reigns under
scrutiny, that of Esarhaddon and Assurbanipal, were the last reigns of a glorious
empire. The two kings that ruled from 680 to 627 BCE owed much to the work
undertaken by their predecessors, and it is necessary to present a general history of the
region, in order to better understand this era. Establishing the background allows the
reader to identify the historical, social, cultural and religious context of the period.
More importantly, it helps to understand the Assyrian structure of imperial
administration by the time Esarhaddon and Assurbanipal come to power.

Rise of Nations
The history of civilization in the Ancient Near East began approximately 9000 years
before the Christian era when "the world's earliest known civilizations arose and
matured" .12 The geographical area of what is termed the Ancient Near East comprises
south-western Asia and Egypt 13 • It effectively groups together the region
encompassed by the contemporary states of Cyprus, Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Jordan,
Turkey, Armenia, Georgia, Iraq, Iran, and parts of Saudi Arabia. 14

In the Anqient Near East, primarily in Mesopotamia, the domestication of crops
enabled man to inhabit a strip of fertile land, and live off it for generations, thus
establishing a permanent living community:
'The greater productivity per household that was possible if families
collaborated in sowing and harvesting provided an incentive for the emergence
of sedentary hamlets and villages.' 15

u SAA 2:6. Parpola and Watanabe (1988).
Bernard Knapp, The History and Culture ofAncient Western Asia and Egypt. (California, 1988), pp.
11.
.

12

13

See Map 2 (Appendix 1).
Knapp (1988). Op Cit, pp. 11.
15
Fekri A. Hassan (1995) "Egypt in the Prehistory of Northeast Africa", in Jack M. Sasson,
Civilizations of the Ancient Near East. Volume 2, (New York, 1995), pp. 672.
14
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New farming techniques enabled farmers to become less dependent on 'dry farming
zones', and agriculture was able to advance based on new irrigation techniques. 16 It
would not be long before powerful city states arose, and with this growth, the
development of an early style of inter-kingdom relations. As the influence of certain
kingdoms grew larger, and trade between these kingdoms increased on an ever-larger
scale, a system of relations was formed.

The advent of trade through surplus production led to an inevitable need to create a
policy dealing with foreign kingdoms so as to better take advantage of economic
dealings. The practice of diplomacy would have built upon existing trade routes and
the knowledge of foreign customs. In most cases it 'seems that the economic horizon
stretched beyond the limits of diplomacy', 17 paving the way for the development of
relations between states. For a trader to successfully sell their ware in a foreign state,
they would have had to know the rudimentary customs of their clients. As early as
1800 BCE, during the reign of Shamshi-Adad I, there is evidence of the existence of
diplomatic relations between two kingdoms, building upon previously established
trade relations and routes. 18 However, for the next four centuries, due to an inability to
successfully compete against its ·neighbours, Assyrian history would enter a 'dark
ages' . 19
The Middle Assyrian period (ca. 1400-1100 BCEi0 provides a glimpse into the state
that was to become the most powerful on earth. The Assyrian kings demonstrated
from early pn Assyria's dependence on a simplistic style of diplomacy. The particular
case of Ashur-nadin-ahhe I (ca. 1440 BCE), who is known to have engaged in

16

William W. Rallo and William K. Simpson, The Ancient Near East: A History. (Fort Worth, 1998),
pp.26.
17
Martin Wight, Systems ofStates, (Leicester, 1977), pp. 33.
18
Jesper Eidem and Flemming Hojlund, 'Trade or Diplomacy? Assyria in the Eighteenth Century BC',
in World Archaeology, Vol. 24, No 3, Ancient Trade: New Perspectives, (Feb, 1993), pp. 441-448.
Assyrian trade with Dilmun is well known, but certain evidence shows that it may be more complex
than that. This article deals with the translation of the word harr ii num, and that it may have been
diplomacy, not trade, propelling relations between the two kingdoms.
19
Refer to Oppenheim (1977), pp. 164-166, for a general discussion on the topic of the Assyrian dark
ages, and the brief rise of Assyria in the late Second Millennium, the Middle Assyrian Period, when
Assyria was freed from Mitanni overlordship.
20
Amelie Kuhrt, The Ancient Near East: c. 3000-330 BC, Volumes I-II, (London, 1995), pp. 348. The
land held by the A~syriah during the middle period are the traditional lands referred to by the NeoAssyrian kings during the Neo-Assyrian resurgence.
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diplomatic approaches to the Egyptian king Tuthmosis III, stands out.21 The first king
of the Middle Period, Ashur-Uballit (ca. 1365-1330 BCE)22 would have learnt from
his predecessor that it was wise to engage in diplomatic practice. Once freedom from
the Mitanni had been assured, Ashur-Uballit claimed the Assyrian throne under the
title of "Great King", and began direct diplomatic contact with the Egyptian court,
undermining the Babylonians.23

This period would also leave behind the foundations upon which Assyrian foreign
policy would build during the ninth century resurgence. From this period onwards we
get Assyrian annexation of territories undertaken in three steps. Firstly, the political
subjugation of a state brought about through the threat of force, or military
manoeuvres? 4 The second step, a favourite of the Neo-Assyrian kings, was the
imposition of non-aggression treaties, usually resigning the non-Assyrian party to
'eternal vassalage' ?5 The third step was the complete domination of a territory,
normally supplemented with deportations and harsh military action.26

Age of Empires
By the end of the Second Millennium, the Middle Assyrian period had finished, and
the Assyrian kingdoms were dependent on other regional powers. It was not until the
turn of the First Millennium that the world's first large empire began to take shape.
Stephen Howe describes an empire as a 'large, composite, multi-ethnic or
multinational political unit, usually created by conquest, and divided between a
dominant c~ntre and subordinate, sometimes far distant, peripheries' .27 The fact that
the world had yet to see a large, fully functional empire was soon to be changed by a
series of aggressive Assyrian kings.

21

Ibid, pp. 348-349.
Ibid.
23
John A. Brinkman (1972), 'Foreign Relations of Babylonia from 1600 to 625 B. C.: The
Documentary Evidence', inAJA 76, No.3 (July 1972), pp. 276.
24
Simo Parpola (1987), 'Neo-Assyrian Treaties from the Royal Archives of Nineveh', in JCS 39
(August 1987), pp. 1 (footnote 3).
25
Ibid.
.
26
Ibid.
27
Stephen Howe, Empire. A Very Short Introduction, (New York, 2002), pp. 30. Intent is an important
part of this definition. Imperialistic aims must exist and be justified in order to create an empire. This
term will suit for the purposes of this research.
22
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The Amarna age of inter-kingdom relations characterizes the last few centuries of the
Second Millennium. 28 Amenhotep III, great Pharaoh of Egypt, and his successor,
Akhenaten, pursued diplomatic interaction with the other members of the Great
Powers Club of the age. 29 Assyria was quick to catch on to this practice of diplomatic
relations. The Amarna period was based on the arrangement that several great powers,
roughly equal in strength, were able to limit each other's power. These great
kingdoms of the Ancient World were induced out of common benefit into diplomatic
relations.
The age of inter-kingdom diplomacy served to weaken several states, allowing
Assyria to expand and consolidate in Mesopotamia. From Akhenaten onwards,
Assyria became a major player on the international scene as it became accepted as a
member of the Great Powers Club, enjoying the endorsement of its actions in
Mesopotamia by none other than Egypt. 30 By receiving Assyrian embassies,
exchanging gifts, and entering into diplomatic relations with the Mesopotamian
kingdom, Egypt was effectively condoning Assyrian expansionist policy. 31 The main
obstacle for Assyria's ambitions during the Amarna Age was the kingdom of Mitanni,
of which Assyria was dependent. As master diplomats, the Hittites were able to crush
the kingdom of Mitanni, without jeopardising the unity of the Great Powers Club, in a
series of lightning campaigns, sweeping aside their forces, and destroying Mitannian
power in the region. 32

The destruction of the Mitanni serves·· to highlight an overall weakness in the
enforcement of actions that would protect those members of the Great Powers Club:
the great distance between Egypt and Mesopotamia, where the Assyrian, Babylonian
and Mitanni kingdoms were located. Rather than marching an Egyptian army over a
28

The Amarna Age started during the reign of Amenhotep III, ca. 1350 BCE, and lasted for over 200
years thereafter. Chronology taken from Sasson (Ed.), Civilizations of the Ancient Near East, 4
Volumes, (New York, 1995).
29
The club comprised Egypt, Mitanni, the Hittites, Babylon and Assyria. For further information on the
subject refer to Mario Liverani, "The Great Powers Club", in Raymond Cohen and Raymond
Westbrook, Amarna Diplomacy, (Baltimore, 2000).
30
An example of such endorsement can be found in EA 15 in William Moran, The Amarna Letters,
(Baltimore, 1992), when Egypt accepts Assyria as a member of the Great Powers Club. The acceptance
came in the form of receiving Assyrian delegations, and the exchanges of gifts giving between Pharaoh
and Assyrian king.
31
EA 15.
32
Trevor Bryce, The Kingd~m of the Hittites, (New York, 2005), pp. 161.
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great distance, negotiating with the victorious parties was the easiest and most
effective solution to the issue. Whilst the Hittites were a new power to be reckoned
with from ca. 1350 onwards, 33 it was the Assyrians who had most to gain from this
action. With this liberation from Mitanni dependence, Assyria was free to compete
with the other powers of the Amarna Age, and enter a formative period in which, for
the next few centuries, the Assyrian concept of foreign policy would be developed. 34

Circa 1274 BCE, the armies of Egypt and Hattusa clashed near a city on the Orontes
River in modern day Syria. After the battle it was the Hittites who remained in
possession of this strategic military outpost on the borders of these two great
kingdoms. 35 With the Egyptians no longer exerting great influence in the Northern
Levant and Mesopotamia and suffering a decline in revenue income from its
dependencies, 36 the Hittites and Assyrians became powers in themselves. The two
combined forces to route and vanquish what was left of the kingdom of Mitanni, and
in turn, Assyria undermined the Hittites by occupying and administering the lands
formerly held by Mitanni. 37
A shadow fell upon those states that bordered the Mediterranean at the turn of the
First Millennium. The archaeological and textual information available to historians
today, dating back to the 13th and

12th

centuries BCE, shows that a major catastrophe

affected the Levant, Egypt, Anatolia and the Mediterranean. A series of large-scale
crop failures in the Mediterranean peripheries triggered human migrations on a
massive sc~le throughout Anatolia and the Levant. 38 This large migration of people,
who often attacked the territories they moved into, precipitated the end of the Hittite
kingdoms. Although they received grain imports from the Egyptians, 39 the added

33

Ibid.
Oppenheim (1977), Op Cit, pp. 165.
35
Ian Shaw, The Oxford History ofAncient Egypt, (New York, 2002), pp. 297-298.
36
John Taylor, "The Third Intermediate Period" (1069-664 BC), (2002), in Shaw (2002), Op Cit, pp.
331.
37
David Warburton, Egypt and the Near East: Politics in the Bronze Age, (Neuchatel, 2001), pp. 212
38
Shaw (2002), Op Cit, pp. 328.
39
These early empires of the world system were in fact agrarian empires, highly dependent on
successful crop yields. Crpp failures would produce famine and irreparable economic damage,
hastening the end of any ancient empire/kingdom/state.
34

21
strain caused by such an influx of peoples was too much of a burden for the
. d
40
k mg om.
This is not to say Assyria escaped tmscathed from this disaster toward the end of the
Bronze Age. However, over three centuries, the Assyrians were able to recover faster
than any other state of the Ancient Near East and Egypt. When all the other states in
the Near East and Mediterranean peripheries were staggering from the

m~or

economic and demographic change that accompanied the transition to the Iron Age
(ca. 1000 BCE), the most remarkable detail about Assyria during this period in the
ninth century is the vigour with which it is able to recuperate itself.41

The Assyrian Monolith
The beginning of the First Millennium saw a series of belligerent Assyrian kings
taking to the throne, and the centre of po"\Ver of the ancient world shift away from
Egypt to Mesopotamia. The Assyrian resurgence in the ninth century began with
Ashurnasirpal ca. 930 BCE, and continued with the warrior king Adad-Nirari II (ca.
911-891 BCE).42 The peak of the first Neo-Assyrian revival was achieved under the
reigns of Ashumasirpal II (883-859 BCE) and Shalmaneser III (859-824 BCE). 43
Whilst the rule of Ashumasirpal II marks the continuity, and conclusion, of Assyria in
the long process of recovering its historical lands4\ Shalmaneser III is the first
Assyrian king to begin an entirely new process; the conquest of lands outside
Assyria's traditional borders.45

The ability of these new Assyrian kings to seemingly recruit large numbers of native
troops to undertake military campaigns, accompanied by a new program of
recolonization, 46 appears to have reversed the demographic damage caused by the
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migrations that marked the end of the Bronze Age. 47 These same kings were also able
to learn from the predecessors, and institute an aggressive foreign policy that suited
their imperialistic aims. The next two hundred years of Assyrian history fluctuate
greatly. It was not until the mid-eighth century that the Assyrian empire began to take
the shape of the monolith it would become a century later. The Assyrian king TiglathPileser III (745-727 BCE) is considered to be the founder ofthe true Assyrian empire.

Tiglath-Pileser III was the first to do away with the large provinces and provincial
power cores. He did so by splitting the provinces into smaller entities, consequently
limiting the power base of the provincial governors. By doing this he developed the
provincial system westward of the Euphrates, creating a large number of new
provinces and vassal states.
By abolishing the old border between the land of Assur and the client kingdoms
of the west, Tiglath-Pileser in fact inaugurated the true imperial phase of
Assyria. 48

Though it is known that Tiglath-Pileser III was succeeded by his son Shalmaneser V
(726-722 BCE), details concerning his reign are obscure. 49 It is unclear whether his
successor, Sargon II, was an outsider who usurped the throne, or another of TiglathPileser's sons. What is beyond doubt, however, is that Sargon II (721-705 BCE) 50
initiated the most successful period in Assyrian history, and the largest empire
building experiment the world had yet seen.

Assyria was able to maintain such a large empire by adopting many different, and
highly successful, tactics and techniques. They were the first to maintain a year-round
standing army. The creation of a professional officer class dedicated to military affairs
gave the Assyrians an undeniable advantage on the field of battle. Secondly they were
easy to assimilate new technologies from their peripheral provinces and vassal
states. 5 1 The end of the Bronze Age and the fall of the Hittite kingdom meant that
many skilled labourers, fluent in the Hittite art of metal work, were absorbed into the
47
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Assyrian empire, and their skills put to work designing new weaponry for the
Assyrian armies. New administrative technologies were put in place, including the use
of Aramaic as a lingua franca, standardized weight systems and effective taxation
management. 52

Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, was the manipulation of the local elite. For far
away provinces it was easier for Assyria to support the ruling elite already in place,
given that they were willing to submit to Assyrian overlordship. It effectively meant
that the ruling elite were able to maintain their status as long as they were willing to
pay taxes, and provide for Assyrian armies should they be campaigning in the region.
The relationship was usually enforced by a treaty or loyalty oath, sometimes preceded
by the sacking and destruction of a city as a show of force, as testified by the textual
records left behind by the Assyrian kings themselves.

The Sargonid kings conquered all who opposed them and under their command the
Assyrian empire stretched from Elam in the east to Egypt in the west, from Babylonia
in the south to Carcemish in Anatolia in the north. Their world empire system
extended as far Spain and encompassed much of the Mediterranean. 53 Sargon and his
successor Sennacherib (704-681 BCE) 54 campaigned all the way up to the gates of
Egypt and quashed countless rebellions within the provinces that made up the
Assyrian empire.

The Peopl~ of Assur

To understand the justification for imperial construction as undertaken by the
Assyrian state, it is necessary to have a basic comprehension of the religious ideology
driving the Assyrian people. Whilst in Egypt the pharaohs were seen as an incarnation
of the deity, the Assyrian kings embodied what their pantheon of gods stood for. The
Assyrian king was the high priest of Assur on earth, a mortal representative of the
gods; 'The Neo-Assyrian royal titularies ... hammer away at the theme of the unique
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proximity ofthe king to the divine realm and extol his god-like powers.'

55

Though not

viewed as a deity, the Assyrian king was expected to enact the cosmic order in the
earthly realm, much like the Pharaoh in Egyptian ideology.

The Assyrian gods were the supreme rulers of their divine universe, and the Assyrian
kings were the supreme rulers on Earth; thus resigning themselves to the cosmic
order:
Intrinsic to the Assyrian perception of history was the notion of the god's
absolute universal authority, a theology with theocratic significance: the gods
are directly involved in the relations of states whose fate they also determine.
They supervise international affairs as well as direct all human matters. War and
peace are at the discretion of the gods. 56

The Assyrians were quite tolerant of the religions of other cultures and they did not
seek to impose their own religious views over those they conquered. They used their
ideology to justify their actions in the field. If the Assyrian gods were masters in the
heavens, then on earth, the Assyrians were to be masters of the four corners of the
world. It was as the gods intended. In reverence of their chief deity Assur, they called
themselves subjects of Assur, and their empire, the land of Assur. They wrote the
names of 'Assyria, the city of Assur, and the national god Assur all as Assur, which
clearly marks the native understanding of the land as the extension of the city and
god'.57

It is the provinces that constitute Assyria proper, 'if you are in Assyria, you are in a
province' .58 There was a much larger degree of internal management by the Assyrian

ruler within the provinces. Governors were appointed by the Assyrian king, usually
from one of the old ruling families of Assur, not the local ruling elite. 59 Since a
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province was part of the internal structure of the empire, it was administered as such.
Territories freshly added as provinces were said to have been returned to Assyria,
'reflecting the ideological centr~lity of the city of Assur, and the city-god' .60

Assyrian Foreign affairs

Today's conventions on international relations, diplomacy and foreign affairs have
made these fields complicated, and they do little to describe the situation present
centuries before the Christian era began. The diplomatic system of the Ancient Near
East during this period was a simple one. The great kings communicated with each
other, cemented pacts and treaties with gifts of precious items, marriages and nonaggression pledges. Foreign policy was determined based on the wants of each king,
and the ideological relationship between these kingdoms. The style of diplomacy
practiced was crude, but it was 'able to achieve results. Intentions were conveyed;
information was gathered; and negotiations successfully concluded. ' 61

Another issue to be raised is the use of the term 'international relations' when dealing
with the pre-modern world. The notion of nation states is a new one, something that
arises out of 181h and 191h Century Europe. The term 'international affairs' implies
relations between nation states, not ancient empires. However, the term foreign affairs
can be applied. Those kingdoms found in the Levant or Egypt were very different
from those found in Assyria or Babylonia, in fact they were quite 'foreign' in several
aspects, be it culture, social structure, ideology and architecture, just to name a few
instances. When referring to the term 'foreign. policy', it should be remembered that
the modern day rules and laws do not apply. In the ancient world it referred to the
policy adopted for dealing with foreign kingdoms and city-states on all levels, be it
economic, martial, or religious. Foreign policy was justified through religious beliefs;
the Assyrian kings were carrying out instructions on behalf of their gods. 62

Shortly before Sargon II took over as Assyrian king, two events of considerable
importance occurred which would affect Assyrian strategy and diplomacy for the next
60
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century, 'the interference of Egypt in Palestine and of Elam in Babylonia' .63 It was
Tiglath-Pileser's meddling in the Levant that brought about the hostilities between
Egypt and Assyria. It meant that until the fall of the Assyrian empire, the Assyrian
kings had to contend with a hostile Egypt, forever interfering in the Levant, greatly
influencing Assyrian imperial policy in the region.

It is important to note the importance of the effect that Assyrian religion had upon
imperial expansion and administration. The proximity in culture, religious beliefs, and
to an extent the pantheon of deities of Assyria and Babylonia, affected the way
Assyria would deal with Babylonia during the years 680-627 BCE. Sharing no such
affinity with the west meant that Assyria could comfortably justify conquest and
plunder in the name of their chief deity, Assur.
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Chapter2
Assyria and the West
This is the li>eaty which &arhaddon. king of Assyria, has concluded with you, in the presence of
the great gods of heaven and earth on behalf of Assurbanipal, the great crown prince designate, ·
son of &arl1addon, king of Assyria, your k)J'd, whom he has named and appointed to the cmwn-

.
h'1p. 64
pl'lnces

To maintain such a large empire, it is necessary to have in place an effective system
of imperial administration. This chapter seeks to present the sort of imperial policy
used by Assyria to control the western states that made up the empire administered by
Esarhaddon and Assurbanipal. It will further explain Near Eastern 'foreign policy' in
terms of the relationship between Assyria and Egypt, and analyse the use of Assyrian
administrative policy in Egypt, Judah and Phoenicia.

The First Millennium in the Ancient Near East presented new challenges to those
kingdoms that had comprised the Great Powers Club. Babylonia had been weakened
from its constant campaigning against the Hurrians and Elamites, and the Mitanni
long deposed by the Hittites. The Hittites were in turn devastated by the famines and
large-scale migrations that heralded the end of the Bronze Age, like many other
kingdoms bordering the Mediterranean. Egypt had fallen into hard times, known
historically as the Third Intermediate Period (1100-650 BCE)65 , and ceased to be a
real threat to Assyrian interests in the Levant by the time of Esarhaddon and
Assurbanipal.

Two Great Powers: Assyria and Egypt
Assyria's rule of Egypt under Esarhaddon and Assurbanipal had no precedent; they
were the only Near Eastern kings, up until then, to have ever governed over Egypt.
Assyrian administrative policies in Egypt can be termed 'foreign policy' as Egypt lay
well outside the land considered by Assyria to be the 'Land of Assur' .66 Further, there
is no documented case of an Assyrian attempt to install a member of the local elite as
64
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ruler of Egypt. There is no distinct case concerning the installation of a member of the
Assyrian royal family in the entire western Near East. Up until the end of the reign of
Tiglath-Pileser III (ca. 740-727 BCE) Assyria and Egypt had avoided entering into
conflict with each other, largely spurred by the spirit of the Amarna period,

67

and the

great distances between the two kingdoms. It was not until Tiglath-Pileser began to
aggressively meddle in the southern Levant that the two powers commenced a period
of hostile relations. 68

The year 701 BCE marked a turning point in Assyrian policy toward Egypt. In that
year 'Sennacherib had faced an Egyptian army supporting rebels against Assyria' ,69
and after 20 years of relatively friendly Egyptian neutrality in Palestine, 70 the
Egyptian king, Shebitku, sent troops to fight alongside the kings of Ekron and Judah
against Assyria. 71 By the time of Esarhaddon's accession the relationship had soured
further, and aggressive administrative policy in Syria-Levant meant that Assyria was
to bring down its entire wrath on Egypt.

Most of the western kingdoms had already been invaded, annexed and re-organized
into provinces and vassal states as a result of the military and diplomatic campaigns of
Tiglath-Pileser III and Sargon II during the Eighth century. 72 Although Esarhaddon's
invasion in 674 BCE was largely unsuccessful, only three years later he was able to
mass another powerful army and invade again. 73 In 671 BCE, Esarhaddon responded
to Egyptian aggression that came as a result of 'military expansion as far as Ashkelon
in Philistia, under Tirhaqa, the militant pharaoh of the 25th Nubian dynasty of
Egypt' .74 Esarhaddon decided that Tirhaqa's actions in Ashkelon were not to be
tolerated, and mobilised his armies upon receiving positive answers after querying the
67
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gods. 75 Assyrian interests in the Levant were being threatened and Esarhaddon was
not about to allow this.
This time the Assyrian armies were successful. Esarhaddon defeated the Egyptian
forces, driving them southwards, and securing, with the capture of Memphis, Assyrian
control over Northern Egypt. Esarhaddon was unsparing in writing his own praise:
Esarhaddon, the great king, the mighty king, king of the universe, king of
Assyria, viceroy of Babylon, king of Sumer and Akkad, king of Karduniash
(Babylonia), all of it (lit., them), king of the kings of Musur, Paturisu and Kusi
(Lower Egypt, Upper Egypt and Ethiopia);' 76

The sack of Memphis was a calculated Assyrian domination ploy, an essential
component of their foreign policy. A country guilty of sin against the Assyrian gods
had to be made an example of. Like in modernity where military manoeuvres can be
used to discourage a country from hostilities, in the ancient world the sacking of an
important city made for a strong visual representation on the fate that awaited those
who opposed Assyrian rule. Esarhaddon then proceeded to install various local
princes as rulers, using the proven formula of utilising the local elite, so long as they
swore loyalty to their Assyrian overlords, to manage a land far from the power core. 77
K. A. Kitchen's study on Egypt during the Third Intermediate Period provides a
listing on local Saite rulers in Egypt before, during and after Esarhaddon's second
invasion. 78

Esarhaddon felt no need to justify the actions of his armies in Egypt other than the
standard Assyrian explanation about carrying out the gods' wishes. According to his
own inscriptions, and the events that unfolded during his invasion of Egypt,
Esarhaddon was only too happy to comply:
When Assur, the great lord, in order to show to the peoples the immensity of my
mighty deeds, extended (lit., made powerful) my kingship over the kings of the
four regions (of the world), and made great my name ... To rob, to plunder, to
75
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extend the border of Assyria, they (the gods) empowered me (lit., fill my
hands). 79
Although Assyrian control over Northern Egypt lasted for a short time, foreign policy
would be the functional term here. 80 Egypt was a culturally different territory on the
very fringes of the Assyrian empire, and the Assyrian king had to rely on the loyalty
of the local princes, secured by oaths, to maintain control over the region.

Deportation was another favourite Assyrian policy that was employed in Egypt. It was
common of Assyrian imperial administration to deport peoples from troublesome
areas to other parts of the empire,81 thus accelerating assimilation. Additionally,
bringing these peoples into the inner folds of the empire made it easier to maintain
control over them, as well as breaking down the sentiment that one feels for their
native land, and the problems that that may cause for a foreign invader. A letter, dated
during the reigns of Esarhaddon and Assurbanipal, and written by the king's priests
deals with the topic of providing grain for Kushites and Egyptians in the Assyrian city
of Assur. 82 It is possible that these were in fact deportees from Assyrian campaigns in
the years under Esarhaddon and Assurbanipal.

Through the diplomatic process of installing loyal princes in positions of power, and
promising them that position as long as they maintained their loyalty to him,
Esarhaddon was able to govern the parts of Egypt he had conquered from afar. 83 The
stark contrast between Assyrian and Egyptian culture, ideology and society
undermined. any plans of an administration similar to that used in Babylonia. In 669
BCE, as Esarhaddon was once again marching on Egypt to consolidate Assyrian
suzerainty, he died en route, leaving the resolution of the Egyptian problem up to his
successor. 84
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Shortly after ascending to the throne, Assurbanipal launched a campaign against
Egypt to continue what his father had begun in 669 BCE, demonstrating his intent to
maintain Assyria's aggressive foreign policy in the west. In 663 BCE they took and
sacked Thebes in what was 'an event that had been totally inconceivable for over
1500 years'. 85 Like the sacking of Memphis, the destruction of Thebes would have
been intended as a propaganda tool cautioning against rebellion. In strict continuance
with his father's policy of ruling Egypt as a vassal state with rulers from the local
elite, Assurbanipal set about restoring to power those princes Esarhaddon had
originally relied on when he had conquered Egypt in 671 BCE.

86

These kings, prefects and governors, whom my father had installed in Egypt,
who had deserted their posts before the advance of Tarku, (and) filled the plain,
I reinstalled in their posts, in their (former) residences. ' 87

Crossroads

Syria-Palestine was the crossroads of the Ancient Near East and it represented a great
'economic and political prize. Every northern and eastern power that arose in the
ancient Near East tried to penetrate and occupy Syria' .88 From the early times of
Egypt, to the Hittite presence in Anatolia and the Assyrians in Mesopotamia, SyriaLevant had been a sought after territory. It is not to say, however, that these kingdoms
were willing agents of foreign imperialism. The region was rife with rebellions, and
an effective administration policy Was necessary for any outside power to maintain a
stable hold over the territory. By the time that Esarhaddon ascended to the Assyrian
throne on <?80 BCE, most of the western kingdoms bordering the Mediterranean had
been conquered and re-organized into vassal states and provinces by Tiglath-Pileser
III, Shalmaneser V, Sargon II and Sennacherib. 89 Esarhaddon, and Assurbanipal had
to maintain the successful Assyrian formula for administering Syria-Palestine so as to
effectively tax the area and control trade. Keeping the local kingdoms in line was the
first step to achieving this.
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The Master Seafarers
The Phoenicians were a collection of small kingdoms spread out across the eastern
Mediterranean seaboard, whose main economic lifeline was trade. Master seafarers'
centuries before anyone else, the Phoenicians harboured a special place in the Ancient
Near East: to control Phoenicia was to control the Mediterranean and one of the
richest trade routes of the Ancient World. George Rawlinson claims that from the

12th

century BCE 'the carrying trade of the world belonged mainly to Phcenicia, which
communicated by land with the Persian Gulf, the Euphrates, Armenia, Cappadocia,
and Anatolia, by sea with Egypt, Greece, Italy, North Africa, Gaul and Spain' .90

Under Esarhaddon and Assurbanipal, in continuance of the predecessors' policies, the
Phoenicians were given a limited form of independence: 'In order to force the
redistribution of trade to Assyria, Assyrian foreign policy usually aimed at control
over its trading partners; yet the Phoenicians remained virtually autonomous' .91
Rather than relegate the Phoenician cities to provincial status, the Assyrians granted
them a form of privileged vassal status. 92 Carcemish, in South-Eastern Anatolia, was
submitted to a similar treatment. Since it was the access point to the Anatolian metal
trade for the Assyrian empire, the local elite was able to exercise a certain degree of
independence. However, the Assyr~an army was always ready to move and quell any
anti-Assyrian influence that might threaten its control over Carcemish. 93

Even so, .f.\ssyrian taxation on Phoenicia was not lenient, and the Assyrians
maintained their own ports in the major Phoenician coastal cities to compete with
the Phoenician ports. The Assyrians instituted a form of management known as
karum, 'defined as the wharf or quay, Assyrian imperial trading colony,

administrative centre, and the tax collecting station' .94 The karum enabled Assyria
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to keep the local elite in power and out of trouble, and it allowed them to maintain
control over, and limit if necessary, trade that passed through Phoenician ports.

It cannot be said, though, that the Phoenicians were openly independent and able to

undermine Assyrian rule. When in 676 BCE the Phoenician kingdom of Sidon
rebelled against Assyria, Esarhaddon had no qualms about marching on the city and
sacking it in true Assyrian fashion. 95
Abdi-milkutti, king of Sidon, who did not fear my majesty, did not heed the
word of my lips, who trusted in the fearful sea and cast off my yoke, -Sidon, his
garrison city, which lies in the midst of the sea ... Like a fish I caught him up
out of the sea and cut off his head. 96
For allying with Egypt, Esarhaddon had the ruling elite beheaded for what was
viewed as a grave act of insubordination. 97

The destruction of Sidon was a show of Assyrian force to discourage further
rebellious behaviour by other Phoenician cities. Shortly afterwards a treaty with Ba'al
of Tyre was accorded with Assyria, '[The treat]y of Esarhad[don, king] of Assyria,
son of [Sennacherib, likewise king of Assyria, with Baa]l, king ofTyre'. 98 The treaty,
rather lenient in terms, was probably a result of a willingness to submit to Assyrian
overlordship on behalf of Tyre after Assyrian actions in Sidon. This somewhat
effective way of controlling anti-Assyrian insurgencies was also used in Egypt in
Memphis and Thebes.

The treaty, where Esarhaddon agrees to entrust Tyre with the former lands of Sidon
and respect the continuity of agreeable relations between Assyria and Tyre, proves the
Assyrian inclination to use diplomacy where possible, although backed up with the
very real threat of brutal retribution. Esarhaddon promises, in exchange for the
acquiescence of Tyre to his rule, protection and respect of Tyre' s assets.
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These are the ports of trade and the trade routes which Esarhaddon, king of
Assyria, [entrusted] to his servant Baal. .. Nobody will [do] injustice [to those]
who are hired [ ... ] and nobody will harm their ships'. 99
The destruction of Sidon and the treaty with Tyre beautifully contrast Assyrian
foreign policy, be it unbridled military aggression or resorting to diplomacy. A treaty
was no good unless an example could be made to convince other kingdoms that action
against Assyria was not in their best option.

When the Egyptian king Tirhaqa moved in on Assyrian interests in the Levant, Ba'al
of Tyre betrayed the treaty that Esarhaddon had imposed on him, and obligingly sided
with the Egyptians. Esarhaddon was only able to fortify the coast around Tyre and cut
it off from the mainland, taking away most of its territorial holdings. As Assurbanipal
marched on Egypt after Esarhaddon' s death, he stopped to accept the submission of
Tyre back into Assyrian rule, as a result of the mainland blockade. 100

During Assurbanipal's second campaign to Egypt in 664 BCE, Ba'al once more
incurred Assyrian wrath by involving himself with the Egyptians, and after the
complete conquest of Egypt by his forces, the Assyrian king focused his energies on
the highly unreliable monarch. Although the Assyrian's did not have the naval
capacity to completely besiege and capture Tyre, Assurbanipal was able to isolate
them once again from the mainland. The Assyrians proceeded to conduct a limited
form of siege warfare which payed off in the end. After overtures from Tyre, that
included sending royal sons and daughters as hostages, the siege was lifted, and Ba'al
was allowed to continue his vassalage to Assyria. 101
In my third campaign I marched against Ba'li, king of Tyre, who dwells in the
midst of the sea, when he did not observe my royal command and did not obey

(lit., listen to, hear) the word of my lips. I threw up earthworks against him, by
sea and land I seized his approaches (lit., ways). I pressed them sorely and made
their lives miserable. I made them submit to my yoke. 102
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Phoenicia's significant position in the international trade scene, a position made
important both by its geographical location and navigational prowess, meant that it
became increasingly important for the Assyrian empire, as it expanded in the Eighth
and Ninth centuries, to control the Phoenician ports and trade networks. 103 It is
possible that this was a method adopted by Assyria to restrict Egyptian access to
international trade routes and deprive it from the enormous wealth flowing through
the Phoenician networks.

In spite of everything, Phoenicia was never comfortable under Assyrian overlordship,
and, after countless participation in rebellions, Assurbanipal felt the need to turn such
major cities, like Tyre in 640 BCE, into Assyrian provinces. Assyrian imperial policy
in Phoenicia ended up damaging Phoenicia's Mediterranean interests, and by the time
that the Assyrian empire fell, the Phoenicians were forced to compete with ever more
powerful Greek states to control the Mediterranean trade routes, eventually losing
ou.
t

104

The Promised Land, and the Southern Levant
Israel and Judah were an oddity in the Ancient Near East, a monotheistic society
surrounded by polytheistic powers. War had separated the two bands of tribes that
comprised the north and south, Israel and Judah respectively. Shalmaneser V laid
waste to most of Israel during his reign, besieging the capital for three years, and
leaving it to his successor, Sargon II, to convert it into the province of Samaria. 105

From the time of Sargon II, Israelite Samaria underwent a period of mass deportation
and heavy taxation. The northern kingdom as an Israelite state ceased to exist. Instead

it was populated with people belonging to the upper classes of Syria, Babylon, and
later Arabia. 106 In an act that was typically Assyrian as part of their religious
imperialism policy, religious symbols from Israel were also removed. 107 Esarhaddon
and Assurbanipal discontinued the policy of deportation that the other Sargonid kings
103
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had carried out, 108 probably because there was not much left of the native population
to deport.

Judah was a different matter entirely. After Tiglath-Pileser III had rampaged along the
Syrian coast, it had been incorporated into the empire as a vassal kingdom. 109 In 671
BCE Sennacherib campaigned against Hezekiah,

110

the ruler of Judah, and laid siege

to Jerusalem, though Judah was spared the fate that befell Israel. The Assyrians,
content with the victory at Lacish in the same year of the invasion and the seizure of
large amounts of booty raised the siege on Jerusalem. The Judean king, now accepting
Assyrian overlordship, reigned for another 15 years. 111

Sennacherib's successors were much more content to follow a foreign policy line that
was less belligerent, and were able to rely on the loyalty of Judah as a vassal
kingdom, whose ruler seemed to realise that the Assyrian war apparatus was too much
to deal with. Esarhaddon was able to launch his second invasion of Egypt, in 671
BCE, with the support, or at the least the neutrality, of Judah. 112 Assurbanipal claims
that when he launches his first campaign against Egypt, Mannasseh of Judah offered
the Assyrian armies safe passage, as well as gifts to the Assyrian king.
In the course of my campaign ... Minse (Manasseh), king of Iaudi (Judah) ... in
all 22 kings of the seacoast, of the midst of the sea and of the dry land, vassals
of mine, brought their rich (lit., heavy) gifts [before me] and kissed my feet.
Those kings], together with their forces ....

113

Both Esarhaddon and Assurbanipal dealt with Mannasseh, and gave him a sort of
favoured vassal status in the Levant, 114 though it was a change in Judean policy, not
Assyrian, that allowed for this. After the Lacish siege, and the envelopment of
Jerusalem by Sennacherib's forces, Hezekiah and his successor no doubt realised that
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with the Assyrian emp1re at its zenith, it was better to ally themselves to the
Assyrians, rather than suffer the same fate as Israel.

Assyria's policy in Judea, and much of Southern Palestine for that matter, had clear
goals. Of the vassal states in the southernmost portion of Assyria's Levantine Empire,
we can clearly distinguish Ekron, Ashdod, Askelon, Gaza and Judah lying in the
buffer region between the Assyrian empire and the Egyptian kingdom. 115 This region,
including Judah, were not turned into provinces so that it could serve as a defensive
zone against Egyptian military action. Since Judah was not a province and therefore
not an extension of Assyria, Assyrian policy dealing with the vassal state falls under
the category of foreign policy.

It is remarkable the amount of foresight shown by the Assyrian kings in maintaining

this system of buffer vassal states in southern Palestine. If this region had been turned
into provinces an Egyptian invasion would have been an attack on an Assyrian
province, and hence on Assyria proper, and dealt with great severity, but it would
have also incurred losses on the garrison troops stationed in the area. It would have
also been seen as a weakening of Assyrian power in its own provinces. By keeping
the local elite in power and maintaining the system of vassal states, any Egyptian
attack would be blunted before it hit the Assyrian provinces. Even in the case of the
vassal state allying itself with Egypt, the pressure of the attack would have to be
shouldered by that same state, so by the time it spilled over into the Assyrian
provinces, the impact would have been reduced. 116

Buffer states serve important purposes in ancient times. A state that normally lay
between two or more rival p6wers was normally tolerated or even encouraged by its
powerful neighbours, since it could provide a limited form of security. 117 Judah, under
Assyrian overlordship, was a buffer state against Egyptian actions in Palestine. Under
this reasoning, we can understand why Esarhaddon and Assurbanipal were content to
maintain the arrangement that Sennacherib had left behind after he had dealt with
115
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HezekiahY 8 It was much more to Assyria's advantage to protect and maintain a
foreign vassal, as long as taxes were paid, and have that same vassal blunt potential
attacks by Egypt.
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Chapter 3
Assyria and Babylonia
In the acoession year of Shamash-shum-ukin, in lyyar, Bel and the gods of Akkad came out of the
city of Ashw; in lyyar on the 24111 they entered Babylon.

119

It is hard to imagine undertaking a study of the Assyrian Empire without encountering
Babylonia, especially during the Neo-Assyrian period. Babylonia commanded a
special place in the Assyrian mindset. Assyrian culture had been richly influenced by
Babylonia, as had its religion. This chapter highlights the closeness between these two
great kingdoms of the Ancient World, and the fact that Babylonia was offered special
treatment during the years that Esarhaddon and Assurbanipal were on the throne. The
chapter will focus more on Esarhaddon's reign than Assurbanipal's since under
Esarhaddon we find the most drastic reversal in Babylonian policy. Assurbanipal
continues his father's policies up until the anti-Assyrian rebellion that started in
Babylonia.

The Babylonian Connection
Assyria and Babylonia share a history so similar and intertwined that it would not be
conceivable to undertake a detailed study of one without touching on the other. The
fortunes of Babylonia at the hands of the resurgent Assyrians fluctuated violently.
Under Sennacherib the city was besieged, conquered, sacked and levelled. In a great
show of religious imperialism, the Assyrians removed the statue of Marduk, the chief
deity of the city, leaving Babylon without its protector. 120 However, Sennacherib's
actions were by no means the norm. Up until the destruction of the city in 689 BCE at
the hands of a victorious Assyrian army on the first day of the month Kislimu, 121 the
Assyrian kings had treated the important Babylonian cities with respect. Sennacherib,
hardened after so many years of war against the Babylonians and angered by the
capture of his son and the subsequent delivery of the Assyrian prince to the Elamites,
broke with this tradition. 122
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The two kingdoms shared several comparable features, such as a similar language,
religion and cultural background. 123 By around 1510 BCE, Assyria's southern frontier
with Babylonia was consolidated when a treaty between the two states was agreed
upon. Another treaty between the two kingdoms was concluded just before 1400
BCE. 124 Towards the end of the Second Millennium, as a result of the Amarna Age
diplomatic system, 125 and Assyria's ability to free itself from the Mitanni yoke, the
two states began an expanded period of direct contact that would last for over six
centuries. As the Hittite presence in Southern Mesopotamia also waned, Assyrian
intervention in Babylonia increased.
It appears that during the early Amarna period, Assyria may have been politically

dependent on Babylonia. In a piece of correspondence from the Amarna Letters
cache, the Babylonian King, Burna-Buriash II, complains to the Pharaoh, Amenhotep
IV, that 'his subjects' are being received without his permission by the Egyptian
court. 126 The subjects that the Babylonian ruler refers to are the Assyrians. 127 This
may be why there is such heavy resistance to Assyrian rule in Babylonia: since they
had once ruled the Assyrians, being conquered in turn by their onetime subjects was
not a pleasant prospect.
During Ashur-Uballit's reign, there is already heavy interference from Assyria in
Babylonian internal affairs when the Assyrian monarch oversaw the removal of an
anti-Assyrian king, instead replacing him with one whose sentiments towards Assyria
were more amicable. 128 From the reign of Tukulti-Ninurta I (ca. 1243-1207) it is
known that the Assyrians entered and sacked Babylon, including the removal of the
Marduk statue from Babylon, thus presenting the Babylonians with their first taste of
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Assyrian rule. 129 It may have also presented Assyria with new perceptions on
theology, and influenced Assyria's own pantheon of deities. With help from Assyria's
perpetual enemy, the Elamite kingdoms in Iran, Babylon was able to affirm its
domination over Assyria, placing a puppet king on the Assyrian throne in 1192
BCE. 130 The next five centuries would be a continual struggle between Assyria and
Babylonia, where more often than not Assyria would try to assert itself over its
southern neighbour, and Babylonia would keep resisting and causing trouble.

Esarhaddon and Babylonia

Under Sennacherib's successor, Babylonia was to receive another drastic reversal in
policy, a change as radical as the one it underwent under Sennacherib himself.
Esarhaddon was 'simply returning to Assyria's normal policy towards Babylon up
until Sennacherib's destruction of Babylon after the rebellion of 694-689'. 131 Shortly
after ascending to the throne of Assyria, Esarhaddon set upon an ambitious plan to
rebuild Babylon in a heartened attempt at reconciling the Babylonians to Assyrian
overlordship. The single greatest threat to conciliation was the fact that the once great
city of Babylon was in ruins. Esarhaddon, who had great respect for Babylonian
scholarship and culture, was endeavouring to win Babylonian support with
respectable actions and deeds. 132

The physical reconstruction of Babylon was the first step in Esarhaddon' s
reconciliation policy with Babylonia. It is important to note that Esarhaddon's actions
toward Bal;>ylonia were unique in Assyrian imperial policy during his reign. No other
victim of Assyrian conquest and destruction received the sort of attention toward
reconstruction and resettlement as Babylon did. 133 This is where Assyrian imperial
administrative policy, relating to Babylonia, contrasts so differently with Assyrian
imperial policy in the West. Esarhaddon made it a clear objective of his time on the
throne to rebuild Babylon:
129
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Esagila, the temple of the gods, together with its shrines, Babylon the city under
feudal protection, Imgur-Bel, its wall, Nimitti-Bel, is outer wall, from their
foundations to their turrets, I built anew, I enlarged, I raised aloft, I made
magnificent. 134

The material rebuilding of Babylon was not the only issue to be resolved.
Sennacherib, officially or ad hoc, had stripped the Babylonian citizenry of the civic
rights that they were entitled to as privileged members of the monolithic Assyrian
empire. Esarhaddon swiftly set about reinstating the favoured status that Babylon had
enjoyed, thus attempting to win over support from Babylonia's ruling aristocracy. 135
This attempt wasn't solely restricted to the restoration of civic rights; it also espoused
cultic patronage, 136 which meant the rebuilding and refurbishing of temples, and the
restitution of divine statues and images. Esarhaddon stated:
The images of the great gods I restored and had them replaced in their shrines to
adorn them forever. Their offerings, which had ceased (to be brought), I reestablished. The sons of Babylon who had been brought to servitude ... I
gathered together and accounted them for Babylonians. Their clientship I
established anew. 137

The question now arises as to why Esarhaddon was so devoted to the restoration of
Babylon considering the endless amount of trouble it had caused Assyria in the past.
It is known that Esarhaddon was a great admirer of Babylonian culture, and respected
the deep r()ots that united both Assyria and Babylonia. 138 Several Babylonian gods,
Marduk above all, were important members of the Assyrian pantheon, and the long
lasting Assyrian cultural dependence on Babylonia should also be noted.

Losing Babylonia would have been unthinkable for Esarhaddon, as it would have
been construed as a sign of Assyrian weakness by the other kingdoms, vassals and
134
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provinces under the administration of the great empire. 139 Babylonia was to Assyria's
south, and the control of Babylonian territories allowed for a geographically important
zone, between the southern fringes of the Assyrian empire and the Elamite kings, to
be properly guarded. On the other hand, Babylonia had been a problem for many an
Assyrian king, and it is likely that Esarhaddon, as a practical ruler, was trying to keep
Babylonia 'quiet with the carrot instead of the stick' .140 Holloway offers the best
explanation:
Within the first year of his accession to the throne, Esarhaddon embarked on an
ambitious, shrewd, and effective foreign policy aimed at Babylonian
conciliation through high profile building works and a nuanced self-image
propaganda initiative. 141

Whatever his reasons for paymg such preference to this form of imperial
administration in Babylonia, it is clear that such a favoured position existed. The
greatest indicator of this is the succession treaty that Esarhaddon had composed
concerning his sons Assurbanipal and SamCiS-sumu-ukin, concluded in 672 BCE. 142
The treaty set out in precise details all the necessary information concerning his
succession. What is most interesting about the treaty, which was enforced in front of
representatives from all over the Assyrian empire, is that it deals specifically with the
issue of Babylonia, and is a unique attempt by Esarhaddon to deal with the 'perennial
Babylonian problem' .143

In the past, more often than not, the Assyria Empire had been rocked by wars at the
end of a king' s reign, and Babylonia, or Elamite opportunists utilising Babylonia as a
platform, 144 had used the occasion to break away, seize territories and generally cause
trouble. By establishing one son on the Assyrian throne, Assurbanipal, and the other
on the Babylonian throne, SamCiS-sumu-ukin, Esarhaddon hoped to avert the chaos
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and disorder that regnal change usually brought to the Assyrian empire. This policy
proved to be quite successful for the first 17 years of Assurbanipal' s reign. 145

The important feature of this treaty is that the Assyrians installed a member of the
royal family, an heir to be precise, on the throne of Babylonia in a serious attempt to
bind Assyria and Babylonia into a pacific relationship. It explicitly implies a
concerned attempt at maintaining a blood bond between Assyria and Babylonia.
(This is) the treaty which Esarhaddon, king of Assyria, has concluded with you,
in the presence of the great gods of heaven and earth, on behalf of Assurbanipal,
the great crown prince designate, son of Esarhaddon, king of Assyria, your lord,
whom he has named and appointed to the crown-princeship. 146

When considering the level of success that Esarhaddon enjoyed, in respect to his
Babylonian policy, during his lifetime, it is important to note the state of AssyroBabylonian affairs since the thirteenth century BCE. For the six centuries that passed
until Tiglath-Pileser III takes the Babylonian throne, in the eighth century, 147 Assyria
had been campaigning against Babylonia, both on the offensive and defensive. In no
point is there acceptance of Assyrian rule in Babylonia, manifesting itself in countless
rebellions, invasions and sackings.

This issue reaches its climax during the rule of Sennacherib, and ends with the total
destruction of Babylon. Esarhaddon has the choice to keep Babylon destroyed and
weak, or rebuilding it. The short-term success that this policy enjoyed is demonstrated
by the fact that for most of Esarhaddon' s reign, and 17 years after it, there is no major
uprising recorded in Babylon. 148 Yet the long-term consequence of this policy would
be the destruction of the Assyrian empire following the death of Assurbanipal.
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Assurbanipal, Samas-sumu-ukin and Babylonia

Due to Esarhaddon's prudent future planning concerning the issue of his succession,
Assurbanipal's accession to the throne of Assyria, and SamaS-sumu-ukin to that of
Babylonia, went relatively smoothly. Shortly after his accession, Assurbanipal set
about completing his father's invasion ofEgypt. 149 He also claims that in keeping to
his predecessor's policy in Babylonia, and no doubt fulfilling Esarhaddon's
succession treaty, he installed Sam<lS-sumu-ukin onto the Babylonian throne to

maintai~ Assyro-Babylonian unity: 'Shamash-shum-ukln, my full brother, I appointed
to the kingship of Babylon' .150 Assurbanipal continued the rebuilding of Babylon, and
kept to Esarhaddon's policy of patronage to the Babylonian cults, especially that of
the chief deity of the city, Marduk. 151 During his reign he commissioned many new
building projects in Babylon, continued the work on the Temple of Esagila, and
established Babylon's privileged position within the empire. 152

When Assurbanipal appointed Sam<lS-sumu-ukin to the throne of Babylonia, he
allowed his brother to take the statue of Marduk back to the temple-complex of
Esagila. 153 Even though Esarhaddon had decreed that the temple devoted to Marduk
be rebuilt and replenished, he had not been able to complete the move of Marduk back
to the city before he died, leaving the job up to his successors. As Assurbanipal
explains:
During my reign the great lord, Marduk, entered Babylon amid rejoicing, and in
Esagila took up his eternal abode. The regular offerings of Esagila and the gods
of Babylon I provided for. The feudal protection of Babylon I maintained, -that
the strong may not injure the weak. 154
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This monumental event was important in winning Babylonian support for the new
king and his Assyrian overlord. 155 For twenty years Marduk had been absent from
Babylon, and the important Ne~ Year's festival had not been performed. 156 There is
little doubt that the sight of a new Babylonian king, returning with the statue of
Marduk, would have been largely welcomed in Babylon after the 'kingless years' .157
The power of imagery here highlights the importance that the Assyrian monarch
attached to Babylonian affairs, and can be added to the already large list of actions
undertaken during the years 680-627 BCE that demonstrate the unique position that
Babylonia held within the Assyrian empire.
There is no change here in Assurbanipal's attitude toward Babylonia since he
followed his father's Babylonian policies. The fact that two siblings sat on the
Assyrian and Babylonian thrones contributed to amicable relations between the two
great kingdoms. Babylonia was able to enjoy a period of prosperity during the years
680-627 BCE. The rebuilding of Babylon by Esarhaddon and Assurbanipal would
eventually lead to that kingdom's ability to take over the administration of the empire
created by the Neo-Assyrian kings after the fall of Assyria following the death of
Assurbanipal.

Like all Assyrian monarchs, Assurbanipal was reluctant to delegate authority, even to
his own brother. 158 Assurbanipal' s disinclination to entrust authority in his sibling,
even in matters relating to Babylonia's internal affairs, came to be an acute
problem. ~ Even when Samas-sumu-ukin was technically the direct superior of the
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Babylonian provincial governors, these same governors were permitted to report
directly to Assurbanipal, sidestepping the chain of command. 160 Though Samas-sumuukin was unhappy with what can only be viewed as the undermining of his authority,
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an issue that he made clear to his brother/ 61 there is little he could have done to
change the situation other than open rebellion. 162

Fifteen years into Assurbanipal's reign, Assyrian and Babylonian relations, partially
due to Assurbanipal's incessant meddling in all things Babylonian, were put under
stress. In an attempt to show that Babylonia was still favoured by Assyria,
Assurbanipal had the ceremonial bed of Marduk returned to Babylon in 654. 163
Nevertheless, when rebellion broke out in 652 BCE, Assurbanipal was ruthless in
putting down the anti-Assyrian coalition. After four years of warfare, Assyrian troops
once again victoriously entered BabyIon after a protracted siege of the city. 164

This time the victory was bittersweet. Assyria's enemies had been decisively
defeated, but four years of civil war had exhausted the power of the Assyrian armies,
depleted her treasury, and once again Babylonia was the centre of Assyrian problems.
Even so, part of the reason that the anti-Assyrian coalition was unable to defeat the
armies of Assyria, aside from the brute might of the Assyrian armed forces, was the
fact that they were unable to garner total support. What is more, many Babylonian
cities opted to co-operate with Assyria, in a clear indication of the short-term success
of Assyria's imperial policy in Babylonia. After the Samas-sumu-ukin rebellion, there
exist no records of any major military campaigns undertaken by the Assyrians, even
though the empire was to last for another three decades. 165

Imperial .Policy in Babylonia: Civil or Foreign?
The case for the classification of imperial administration in Babylonia is difficult due
to its unique position within the Assyrian empire. A case can be argued for the term
'civil' to be used when referring to what sort of policy was applied to Babylonia.
Cultural and lingual proximity support this argument. Assurbanipal' s brother sat on
the throne of Babylonia, and that by receiving such privileged rights under the
161
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Assyrians, Babylonia cannot be considered a vassal state, but more likely an extension
of the Assyrian heartland. Also, when Assyria went to war, it was two brothers at the
helms of opposing armies. Two brothers going to war against each other would argue
the case for the term 'civil war' when referring to the Babylonian rebellion. 166
Another line of reasoning can be found in the willingness of the Assyrian king to
assume the kingship of Babylonia, as was the case for Esarhaddon.

The style of administration in Babylonia was also different to the extent that
Assurbanipal was concerned, and willing to meddle, with the state of Babylonian
internal affairs. No other kingdom of the Assyrian empire receives such a treatment
bordering on micro-management. 167 The depth of Assyrian control on Babylonian
internal affairs is reminiscent of Assyrian provincial administration, and a province is
considered to be an extension of Assyria proper.

Two other factors contribute to the idea of 'civil' policy: the civic rights reinstated by
Esarhaddon, and the freedom from taxation on Babylonia's religious centres.
Esarhaddon offers the peoples of Babylon civic rights similar to those held by native
Assyrians, in a calculated move to benefit from Babylonian goodwill. Freedom from
taxation was a benefit enjoyed by those living in Assyrian religious, but not
administrative, centres. When Esarhaddon offered the city of Babylon similar civic
rights to those available to native Assyrians, freedom from taxation for cult centres, in
particular the city ofBabylon, was also implied. 168

Chapter 4
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Comparison: Differences and Similarities?
'Who under the protection of Assur, ·Sin, Samash, Nau, Marduk, Ishtar of Nineveh /star if Arbela,
the great gods his lords, made his way from the l'ising to the setting sun, having no rb'a1
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The preceding chapters have provided an account of Assyrian imperial administration
policies in several areas of its empire, under the kings Esarhaddon and Assurbanipal.
This chapter will exclusively aim at highlighting the main differences in Assyrian
policy towards its western empire, and that used in its administration of Babylonia.
The differences in Assyrian imperial policy make us question the Assyrian reasoning
behind their choices. Assyrian theology demanded its warrior kings to carve out a
great empire and imitate the rule of Assur and the other Assyrian gods in the heavens.
Conquest, devastation and merciless destruction, though never wanton, were
necessary to expand Assyria's empire into the Levantine states, especially to protect
its interests against attacks and advances from the other world power, Egypt.

Why were Esarhaddon and Assurbanipal so different in their manner of conduct in
Babylonia as compared to the west? Would it not have been easier to leave it
destroyed and unpopulated, an empty buffer state unable to create any sort of
significant rebellion that would have threatened Assyrian sovereignty? Was
conciliation applicable to Babylonia only?

Difference,s: The Bureaucratic Structure

Babylonia sustained a favoured position m the planning of Assyrian imperial
administration in the conquered territories, a fact that is quite blatant for all to see.
The most important indicator to this is the installation of an Assyrian prince on the
Babylonian throne, a royal heir to be precise, and the elder sibling of the crown
prince. Esarhaddon was no fool, he was trying to pre-empt future Babylonian
insurgencies by installing two brothers on the thrones of Assyria and Babylonia and
using that as a platform for conciliation.
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Nowhere in Assyria's western empire do we see a member of the Assyrian royal
family sent off to directly rule over a province or vassal state. The installation of
Samas-sumu-ukin on the Babylonian throne was unique. Esarhaddon was able to not
only end Babylon's 'kingless' years but also find in Assurbanipal a suitable heir,
willing to carry out his wishes for Babylonia. Assurbanipal, fulfilling his father's
testament, sets his elder brother upon the throne of Babylonia, and allows for the
statue of Marduk to be returned. These acts of patronage by the Assyrian kings are
visible only in Babylonia. There are no known records to this date that illustrate any
sort of Assyrian attempt at restoring destroyed kingdoms in Egypt or the Levant.

The level of management of Babylonian internal affairs, including economic, military
and administrative dealings, by the Assyrian king is not mirrored elsewhere in the
empire. In Egypt and Judah the level of control is quite superficial, limited mainly to
the selection of local rulers in the Egyptian case. The situation in Tyre is similar
excluding the appointment, as part of the treaty between Ba' al and Esarhaddon, 170 of
Assyrian representatives to help the king of Tyre in matters relating to the Phoenician
ports, undermining Ba'al's authority in port affairs. 171 It is an indicator as to who
wielded the real power in Babylonia. The answer in this case is Assurbanipal since
Samas-sumu-ukin had no military forces under his control, and it was Assurbanipal
who held the final authority in all things concerning Babylonian foreign and internal
affairs and defence. 172

In Egypt, Esarhaddon ruled the kingdom by way of utilising the local elite as a means
of control. Rather than abolishing the effective administrative structure the Egyptians
had in place, Esarhaddon was able to apply a formula successfully proven in the other
corners of his empire. Without sending a member of the Assyrian royal family,
Esarhaddon installed into offices several members of the local elite, who pledged their
loyalty to Assyria:
Over all of Egypt I appointed anew kings, viceroys, governors, commandants,
overseers and scribes. Offerings and dues I established for Assur and the great
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gods for all time, my royal tribute and tax, yearly without ceasing, I imposed
upon them. 173
Esarhaddon was able to install local kings into power and was willing to promise
them assistance if their position was challenged as long as the taxes flowed into
Assyrian coffers, and trade was exploited by merchants loyal to Assyria. Assurbanipal
was able to offer that same protection. When re-conquering the kingdom in 664-663
BCE he re-installed the original rulers that his father had put in place.

In Judah the different situation was dealt with accordingly. Since Sennacherib had
already inflicted severe punishment on the Israelite kingdoms, including the ruin of
Israel, the kings Hezekiah and Mannasseh of Judah were willing ally themselves with
Assyria. They readily accepted Assyrian overlordship to protect their land against
further ravages. There was no need to meddle with the local ruling structure, so
Assyria left it largely unchanged, preferring this vassal kingdom to remain nominally
independent, and continue to function in the role of buffer state.

In Phoenicia, no doubt both Esarhaddon and Assurbanipal would have liked to have
made some changes in the ruling structure of Tyre. When Sidon fell, Esarhaddon
entrusted those lands that once belonged to the city into the hands of Ba' al of Tyre.
Ba' al was quick to forget his loyalty to the man who had installed him on the throne
of Tyre, and was a participant in several insurrections that troubled the Assyrians in
the Levant. Unfortunately for both Assyrian rulers, the island fortress was beyond
conquering by their armies. Ba' al of Tyre was able to get away with many an
indiscretion due to the geographical situation of his city. He was able to maintain his
position as king of Tyre by quick political manoeuvring, and offering peace
settlements. Had Tyre been on the mainland it is conceivable that the city would have
suffered a similar fate to that which befell Sidon.

The Assyrian kings were content to allow the local kings to remain on the throne; they
did not need the upheaval that usually followed the downfall of a king in the ancient
world. Assyrian ideology meant they had to go out and conquer an empire for their
gods, but not impose their religion on other cultures, or depose the kings that upheld
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them. Acts of religious imperialism are only present when a king has 'sinned' against
the Assyrians, 174 and can no longer offer his gods, nor the Assyrian gods, the
protection and respect they so rlghtly deserve. 175

Differences: Destruction, Rebuilding, and the Power of Imagery

The destruction of Babylon at the hands of Sennacherib was by no means the normal
manner for the Assyrian's to deal with Babylonia. Esarhaddon, by rebuilding
Babylon, was reverting to the more common practice of not destroying Babylon after
each war against it, and offering royal patronage to the city so important to Assyrian
culture. The rebuilding of Babylon would have come at a steep cost. Esarhaddon
spared no expenses to ensure Babylon once again became a proud and powerful
city. 176 Assurbanipal did much the same.

In direct contrast, no effort was spared to reduce Memphis and Thebes in Egypt, and
Sidon in Phoenicia, to rubble for grave acts of insubordination and dissent, nor are
there any inscriptions that deal with an attempt by the Assyrian monarchs to rebuild
these cities. Sidon's destruction was a warning to the other Phoenician cities to not
entertain fantasies about direct disobedience against Assyria. The sacking of Memphis
by Esarhaddon' s armies served the same purpose, and it would have been a powerful
admonition toward the pharaoh, Tirhaqa, to not come back. Though it was standard
practice of the victorious army to loot and sack a city, these actions were no doubt
useful propaganda for the Assyrian kings, and they would proudly boast of their
vengeful nature. On the conquest of Memphis, Esarhaddon wrote, 'Memphis, his
royal city, in half a day, with mines, tunnels, assaults, I besieged, I captured, I
destroyed, I devastated, I burned with fire' .177

The power of imagery in the Assyrian management of their empire is not to be taken
lightly. Two examples can be looked at to highlight the differences found in image
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representation in Babylonia, versus that found in the western portion of the Assyrian
empire. 178 The first one is the Zinjirli stele, set up in Northern Syria, in which we find
a triumphant Esarhaddon, a cup for pouring libations to the gods in one hand, and a
mace in the other. Kneeling at his feet are Tirhaqa of Egypt and Ba'al of Tyre, both
leashed to a rope that is held by Esarhaddon. What this image is meant to portray is
not in discussion, what is surprising is the aggressiveness of it, no doubt used to
impress upon the western states the omnipotence of Assyrian imperial power.

The second image is much different, and it is one from the time of Assurbanipal. It
shows the Assyrian king actively engaging in rebuilding activities in Babylon. In this
image, Assurbanipal is carrying the weight of a basket laden with building materials
upon his shoulders. This is an attempt to cast the Assyrian king in a positive image,
that of benevolent overlord, actively contributing to Babylon's reconstruction.
Though both the Zinjirli stele and the image of Assurbanipal are similar in the fact
that they serve to represent an image of the king as supreme ruler, the way they go
about doing so is much different. One instils fear and awe, the other respect and
admiration.

Differences: Social and Religious

The return of the Marduk statue by Assurbanipal, in the hands of Sama§-sumu-ukin, is
a powerful public display of cultic patronage, a culmination of the hard work
undertaken by Esarhaddon to try to appease Babylonian sentiments. Esarhaddon had
begun the, rebuilding of the Esagila temple complex, which Assurbanipal would
continue after his father's death. It was not Assyrian policy, nor part of their religious
ideology, to convert lands that they had conquered to the Assyrian faith. Whilst
religious imperialism was a standard practice to morally weaken the enemy, and
punish a city for resisting Assyrian rule, it was not fed by a desire to proselytise. We
find no other case of religious patronage similar to what happened in Babylon, and
some of the other important Babylonian cities, like Ur and Uruk.

When Esarhaddon decides to rebuild Babylon, it is obvious that the displaced
population must be allowed to return to their city. A reversal of the Assyrian
178
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deportation policy is effected. Contrasting Esarhaddon and Assurbanipal' s actions in
Egypt, the original inhabitants of Babylon are allowed to return from forced exile. Not
only that, but the Assyrian kings decide to restore full civic rights back to the
population of the city of Babylon. Rights similar to those enjoyed by the Assyrian
population in the core Assyrian cities. Where else in the Assyrian empire is another
example of civic patronage available? The answer, to put it simply, is nowhere. It was
exclusive to Babylonia.

Why?
The questions that arise to this variation in policy are difficult to answer. It is clear
that a special relationship existed between Assyria and Babylonia, and that
Esarhaddon held great respect for Babylonian culture, and that Assurbanipal respected
his father's ambitions. Assyrian ideology stated that it was their divine duty, as
entrusted to them by the gods, to go out and conquer lands in the name of Assur.
Conquering those kingdoms that composed its western empire fulfilled this divine
duty. These were distant lands composed of foreign peoples, with different ideologies
and cultural backgrounds. To ravage these lands not only weakened the enemies of
the empire, but it served to bring in many riches, and satisfy the belligerent gods of
the Assyrian pantheon, 'the Assyrian domination is sanctioned by the gods, and thus
opposition to the subjugation is sin' .179

There is also the idea that conquest is not just advantageous because of the immediate
material agvantage, 180 but it also serves t~ legitimise a ruler's position on the
throne. 181 This is especially the case for the Assyrian warrior kings. Conquering the
western states through force, rather than persuasion, was always an acceptable option
for the Assyrian kings, who used war to justify their position as executor of Assur' s
will on earth.

The long and complex history that Assyria shared with Babylonia made this idea of
conquest through force less palpable, though not totally undesirable. 182 Both
179
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Esarhaddon and Assurbanipal, though ruthless leaders when the situation deemed it
necessary, were learned leaders, and held respect for Babylonian culture, religion and
academia. It was also clear that many of Assyria's traditions, and some of its gods,
were directly influenced by Babylonia. How were these kings to justify an aggressive
move against a people so similar to their own? War with Babylonia was 'hampered by
extra susceptibilities, and needed extra ideological foundation' .183 Esarhaddon
preferred not to, and instead was willing to conquer Babylonia via diplomacy. His
rebuilding of the city, the re-instatement of their civil rights and his cultural patronage
of the city were just as effective in maintaining Babylonia pacified as having a large
army camped outside ready to enter the city at the first hint of rebellion, leaving these
armies free to be concentrated elsewhere. 184

Another reason for the material rebuilding of Babylon is similar to the reason attached
to the Assyrian preservation of the vassal state system in the southern Levant. The
Elamite kingdoms, in modern day Iran, were forever causing the Assyrians grief by,
more often than not, instigating rebellions against Assyria in Babylonia. To have a
strong Babylonian ally, loyal and united under the Assyrian cause, it could act in a
role similar to a buffer state against Elam, and serve as a safe platform to launch
future campaigns eastwards. Though Assyria was much more involved in Babylonian
internal affairs than in its vassal buffer states, to maintain a strong Assyrian presence
that was positively viewed and actively accepted Babylonia, may have been a
deterrent against Elamite machinations.

Assurbanipal continues on the work started by his father through more cultural
patronage, including the rebuilding of the Esagila temple complex, and allowing the
Marduk statue to be returned when his brother ascends to the Babylonian throne. He
also continues his predecessor's policy of materially rebuilding the city. Assurbanipal
is forced into war against Babylonia because an anti-Assyrian coalition, at the head of
which is his own brother, openly declares its intentions. The Assyrians, not willing to
show any weakness, crush the rebellion in four years, and once again march into
Babylon. This was not to be the final chapter in the relationship between Assyria and
Babylonia.
183
184
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Conclusion
They marched along the back of th~ Tigris. {. .. they encamp]ed against Nineveh From the month
§ivan until the month Ab-for three [months- .. J ... they subjected the city to a heavy siege.
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Even though the Assyrians practiced differing imperial policies in different parts of its
empire, the empire collapsed by overextending itself and incorporating too many
foreign elements into its army. In 640 BCE Assyria held in its grip the four corners of
the Ancient World. By 612 BCE, Nineveh, the administrative capital of the empire,
had fallen to the Medes. In less than three decades, it would lay in ruins, forever
consigned to history, and never to rise again.

Through the employment of many techniques, the Assyrian empire was able to amass
an expanse of territory so large that much of the civilized world was under its thumb.
The Assyrian warrior kings were able to assemble colossal armies, and convert them
into a force so formidable, so well trained, and so advanced in weaponry and strategy,
that they were able to conquer all who opposed them. These cunning kings did not
just rely on military muscle to build their empire however; they employed other
methods, such as the imposition of treaties and non-aggression pacts. They found that
it was almost as useful to employ diplomatic methods into their experiment in empire
building, and more often than not it proved to be more cost effective than marching an
army to level a city. That said, it must not be forgotten that the Assyrians only looked
out for the.mselves and any treaty or pact was backed up by a very real threat of
violent action.

Maintaining and effectively running an empire is just as important as conquering it,
and for this purpose the resourceful Assyrians employed different policies for
imperial administration. From 680 to 627 BCE, when their empire was at its hubris,
the kings Esarhaddon and Assurbanipal employed dissimilar administrative policies in
different parts of their empire.
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The first Near Eastern power to conquer Egypt, the Assyrian experience in this rich
land was new, but they managed to apply a policy that had been proved in other parts
of their empire. The manipulation of the local elite meant that Assyria was able to
effectively use the governing structure in place, appointing kings or rulers loyal to the
Assyrian cause, offering protection to the local elite should they come under foreign
invasion, or see their position of power challenged by local elements. It was a useful
foreign policy for dealing with a land so far from its own. One could argue that they
were pioneers in the art of what is now known as diplomacy and international
relations.

In Phoenicia, the situation was different due to a geographical reason. Though Sidon
had been razed for resisting Assyrian imperialism, Ba' al of Tyre was able to get away
with many insubordinate acts due to Tyre's position as an island fortress, one that the
powerful Assyrian army was unable to reach. Had Tyre been part of the mainland, it
is probable that the Assyrian army would have repeated what they had done with
Sidon. It was a mixture of diplomacy and military action that kept Tyre pacified and
paying its share of tribute, until Assurbanipal had it converted into another province.
Ba' al, although quite disloyal at times, was a local ruler installed by Esarhaddon, and
maintained by Assurbanipal. As was the case with Egypt, a local ruler was used by
the Assyrians to manage Tyre's territories.

In Judah we once again see a different situation. Both Hezekiah and Mannasseh were
willing to ,accept Assyrian overlordship, fearful of suffering a fate similar to that of
Israel before it was turned into the Assyrian province of Samaria. The destruction of
Israel, and the deportation of its population proved to be a powerful warning to Judah
to not entertain hopes of rebellion. They maintained their neutrality as Esarhaddon
and Assurbanipal campaigned in Egypt, and the two Assyrian rulers were willing to
let this important buffer state maintain nominal independence. The Assyrian policy in
Judah, and some other southern Levantine kingdoms, can be considered a foreign
policy aimed at effective defence. Measures taken to ensure these states were kept as
vassal buffer kingdoms, meaning that they were Assyria's first line of defence should
a powerful force attack the Assyrian empire through the Levant.
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On the other hand, the imperial administration policy that Assyria adopted in
Babylonia could not have been more unlike. Esarhaddon sought to rebuild Babylon
after its destruction at the hands of Sennacherib, and, for many reason, he was willing
to pay Babylon serious patronage in all areas. The city was rebuilt at great cost to the
Assyrian treasury and even the Esagila temple complex was restored. The civic rights
of Babylon were re-instated, and a serious attempt at reconciling the two
neighbouring kingdoms was made when Esarhaddon placed two of his sons,
Assurbanipal and Sama.S-sumu-ukin, on the thrones of Assyria and Babylon
respectively.
Assurbanipal was thrust upon the Assyrian throne to continue his father's policy of
appeasement in Babylonia. He continued public works, and when he had his brother
installed on the throne of Babylonia, he made sure the statue of Marduk was returned.
Kidnapped by Sennacherib in an act of religious imperialism, the return of Marduk
enabled the proud Babylonians to enact their New Year's festival, and once again
enjoy the protection oftheir city's chief deity.

Furthermore, the use of positive imagery by the Assyrian kings in Babylonia fostered
the idea that they were benevolent rulers with Babylonia's best interests at heart. This
research corroborated that this contrasted with the sort of imagery found concerning
Assyria's management of the western portion of its empire. Here, the Assyrian kings
portrayed themselves as vengeful rulers, ready to bring hardships onto those who
opposed Assyrian rule. The Zinjirli Stele, found in Syria, is a perfect example.
Unusually aggressive in its presentation, it showcased Esarhaddon as a powerful
overlord, willing to resort to violence to maintain the stability of his empire. It is in
stark contrast to the image of a benevolent Assurbanipal actively contributing to the
rebuilding ofBabylon.
The reasons for such an abrupt change in policy are many. The Assyrian pantheon
included Assyrian gods, and Marduk was an important deity for the Assyrians.
Babylonia and Assyria also shared a long, rich and deeply intertwined history. Since
the end of the 16th century BCE they had been in a state of constant contact. Many
times during their long history, one would dominate another, and assimilation of
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culture, religion, bureaucracy and language was possible, thus by the time Esarhaddon
took power, there were many similarities. It is quite reasonable to believe that the
Assyrians were unable to apply, or at least justify, such a belligerent policy with a
culture so similar to their own.

At the same time, Assyrian kings used conquest, in the name of Assur, as a means to
legitimise their reigns. In the name of the Assyrian gods they were meant to subjugate
all those who challenged Assyrian attempts at re-enacting the established cosmic
order. Whilst Babylonia, as previously discussed, created a problem, the Levantine
states and Egypt did not. Undoubtedly, the destruction of Thebes, Memphis and Sidon
served as warning to those who harboured rebellious attitudes toward their Assyrian
overlords.
Finally, this research confirmed that even though by the mid 71h century BCE, 'the
enemies of Assyria lay prostrate, conquered and devastated, the demise of the
Assyrian empire was not to be avoided. Like an ageing star, the Assyrian empire had
grown to untold size and magnificence, and imploded as a result of over extension.
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The Zinjirli Stele, found in the Vorderasiatisches Museum, Berlin (VA 2708).

·(~9806

WH) ndd!SlOH WOlJ IUd!uuqmssv JO UPlS

IL

72

Kin.g'.r: nam._e
.~Sh;r·raot

l

As~ur·n~&dli1·a~he
Enll!·r.~~Lr H
A~!ur·r1irut t1
AsJ~r-be 1-n i~d:J
A.S~ ur· r:m· r.ise5u
As~ur·nadlrt·ahhe
E.riba-Ac~d t
A~sur-u ;,alli ~ {

r

14~Z.-t427

t .126-142:)

g1S-l4l t
1410-1403
if

6:,:\t-n:c2ri
Arik·den·ili

1402-1393
12·92~1366

1365--1330
1'319<320
1319- 1308

Adad·n1rui f

!307-1275

Sha\m;;.,eser I

\274--1245
1144-1203

·rukulti-Ninur:a r
A ssur· 1 adtn · :1 ;,li

A~Su:-n[ro:i

1ft

E:1 ;1,· kudu:·ri ·qi.L~
N tr:L:rta-apil· Ek·,:r
A·Hur·dein f

1207-!20~

1203-1198
l197-lt~3

1191-t 180
1179-ll34

Nin~na~tukulti ·Anuf

M~Jtak ~ tl·N l:sk u
AS§ur·res·!~i
Tigla~h-PUeser I
A~"rld·apl~-Ekuc
A~~ur·bet-kala

r

Ex lb3· Adad rr
Sam!i-Adad (V
.A.§§urr.a$irpal £

S~·wlm~ne~e:-

r:

A~~ur-nmtd

IV

As§uN·abi

n

A~~m-res·i~~ U
T:gla.ch-Pite~~r £i

11.;3-1 115
t 115-10·n

t07'1-l075
l074-i057
1056-105.5
105~10 51

lOS0-1032
103! - 1020
HH9-10tc.
1013-973
972- YflS

967-935

As~ur·dc:r.

9J~9l2

A~~urn<l~i=-p~l
Sha:mane~er

4ll-89l
89C-8S4
8$3-$59
858-82.4
823- Bil
810-783

ti
Ad.;.d-ni;eri H
Tl.!kultt·Ni.nurta II

rr

trr

~an;. ~i·Adad V

Adad·n~rari 1ll
Shi:dtl1ar.eser tV

AHu r-dQ.r. Ill
ABur-r.m.d V

7£Q.-773
772--7'55
751.-745

Tlg!a.th·Pt~e:~oe;- !£(

744-727

Sha\mane.ser V

72(r.-.722

So1rg{ln ri

721-705
7Q4-681

Se:-tilacherib
Esarbaddon
As~~1rba ntpat

~68-627

Ag~ur·t:.tet-ita.n ~

!110-6~4?

68()...6-69

S\n·~umu·H~ir

Sm·br·1skun
As~ur·ubaJ[~

-ti12.

lf

6-:l-609

Chronology of Assyrian Kings
Source: Postgate, John N. (1992), 'The Land of Assur and the Yoke of Assur', in

World Archaeology, Vol. 23, No 3, Archaeology of Empires. (Feb, 1992), pp. 248.

